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Mobile Bot "Perkele Lite" [Android Only]

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Here's some evidence of Android malware commoditization — an ad for "Perkele Lite"— a kit to generate trojans which catch and forward SMS messages. Quite useful in cracking two factor authentications.

Perkele Lite

For more information, see: Krebs on Security.

On 07/03/13 At 10:44 AM


Mobile Threat Report Q4 2012

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Our Mobile Threat Report Q4 2012 was published yesterday.

Mobile Threat Report Q4 2012

The Mobile Threat Reportis a Product of F-Secure Labs.

No team outside of F-Secure Labs reviewed its content prior to publication… other than a fellow on the brand team who offered some guidance on our use of logos and color.

Also check out the mobile section of our generally focused H2 Threat Report for additional context on the mobile malware scene.

Enjoy!

On 08/03/13 At 03:58 PM

Google Play: Potentially Unwanted

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Google Play has a problem — and it isn't malware.

Depending on location, Potentially Unwanted Applications (PUA) can be rather difficult to avoid.

Here's a screenshot of User Reviews from a "weather widget" application:

Google Play, User Reviews, English

In English (both U.S. and U.K.), there are eight user reviews. Just eight. Even if you click on a link to "Read All User Reviews".

But if you use the Danish UI… this is one additional review you'll see:

Google Play, User Reviews, Danish

And it's good that Danes can see it, because the reviewer explains it's a "nice" app that uses push notifications to drop spam ads, one of which presented his ten year-old daughter with an offer to win an iPad. The daughter provided her father's phone number… and it ended up costing 150 Danish Krone (about 26 USD).

Worst of all — this weather widget app is the second result among free apps if Danes search for "vejr".

More popular, and far more reputable, applications such as "AccuWeather" (TM) haven't done Search Engine Optimization for the Danish market and so end up lower in "relevant" results.

Here are the Russian user reviews:

Google Play, User Reviews, Russian

There's a word being repeated in the reviews: вирус — that's Russian for "virus".

Which technically, it isn't — even if it is using notifications to drop spam ads to sites which use multiple redirects to enable geo-aware affiliate schemes. Not a virus — but definitely unwanted.

That's the way a lot of "free" applications are in Google Play. Results vary by location. In Finland, this PUA drops notifications which redirect to a poker app, which involves little more than a commission being paid out if the poker application is installed. In Denmark, the notifications sometimes redirect to SMS billing schemes. In Russia… well, it could redirect to almost anything.

There's no way to know what you'll get until you get it.

And unfortunately Google Play doesn't provide tools to avoid those attempting to game the system.

Here's a Google Play search result:

Google Play, We couldn't find anything for your search

Hmm, couldn't find anything.

Google Play lacks useful tools or even a decent set of sort options. But then — if one could sort through Play results — fewer searches would be generated which the world's biggest advertising company could then use to profile its users. Fewer searches equals fewer data points. Search is for better or worse part of the Android experience.

Google doesn't do sort.

So search it is. But it's somewhat strange that neither Google Translate nor Maps are used to enhance the Play experience.

Translate — is there some reason why the company whose Chrome browser offers to translate almost everything can't be bothered to translate (or even offer to display) all of its Play reviews?

Maps — this is just an educated guess, but many positive reviews for apps of questionable quality are probably from the developer's back yard. Personally, we'd like to see where the reviewers are located. A feedback map would be much more useful than the current bar graph.

Google Play: there's room for improvement.

On 11/03/13 At 04:12 PM

Exploit Kit Distribution in the Wild

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Have you ever wondered which exploit kits are the most prevalent?

We have been tracking several exploit kits that we have identified these past few months and it's interesting to see which gets the biggest chunk of the pie:

exploit_kit_chart (72k image)

56% of the coverage is owned by only three exploit kits: Blackhole, Sweet Orange and Cool.

Blackhole, a kit that has been around for almost three years, is still keeping a strong presence at no. 1 with 27% of the exploit kit coverage. Followed by Sweet Orange with 18% and Cool with 11%.

On 12/03/13 At 04:54 PM

You only click twice

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Once again, The Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto delivers impressive research into surveillance done with trojans and backdoors. They have today released a report called You Only Click Twice: FinFisher’s Global Proliferation

You Only Click Twice

Next week, the Canada Centre for Global Security at the University of Toronto will be hosting Cyber Dialogue 2013, a conference focusing on cyberspace security and governance.

On Monday the 18th, I'll be participating in a panel called "The Digital Arms Trade" with Dmitri Alperovitch, Shelly Han, Eric King, Morgan Marquis-Boire, Chris Soghoian, and Lhadon Tethong.

Mikko

On 13/03/13 At 03:06 PM

Flash Exploit Targets Uyghur Website

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It seems that attacks against Uyghur haven't stopped. We have recently encountered a compromised Uyghur website that renders a malicious flash exploiting the CVE-2013-0634 vulnerability.

site (472k image)

The flash file contains two DLL files each embedded with EXE binaries. One DLL is for 32-bit systems, while the other appears to be for 64-bit systems.

hiew (75k image)

The executable binaries are also digitally signed with different certificates.

cert (116k image)

The sample signed with the invalid certificate from MGAME Corp. was the same one analyzed by FireEye more than a month ago. The other binary queries blog.sina.com.cn for updates.

Similar samples of these threats were also seen used in Tibetan targeted attacks.


Related samples:

  •  977bb28702256d7691c2c427600841c3c68c0152 – Exploit:SWF/Salama.B
  •  82b99d5872b6b5340f2c8c0877d6862a6b1f6076 – Trojan.Agent.AYYE
  •  040069e5ecf1110f6634961b349938682fee2a22 – Trojan.Generic.8698229
  •  35161bd83cbfe216a03d79e3f5efea34b62439a6 – Trojan:W32/Agent.DUJV
  •  ce54a99d0a29c945958228ae7d755519dee88c11 – Trojan.Agent.AYAF

Post by — Karmina and @Timo






On 13/03/13 At 06:47 PM

About the Security Content of OS X Mountain Lion v10.8.3

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Apple has released update v10.8.3 for OS X Mountain Lion. And as always, it's interesting to read about the security content.

The details about CoreTypes: CVE-2013-0967 really caught our attention:

CVE-2013-0967

"Impact: Visiting a maliciously crafted website could allow a Java Web Start application to be launched automatically even if the Java plug-in is disabled."

Even if the Java plug-in is disabled?

That's interesting…

On 15/03/13 At 09:27 AM

Apple Security: "Safe" Files

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Things that Apple's OS X 10.8.3 update patched — which may allow for arbitrary code execution — that are also on "safe" file type list used by Mac browsers: ImageIO (picture); IOAcceleratorFamily (picture); PDFKit (PDF); QuickTime (movie).

OpenSafeFileAfterDownloading

Open "safe" files after downloading… on by default.

You may wish to consider unchecking that particular box.






On 15/03/13 At 02:22 PM


Weev Gets 41 Months

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The rather pathetic story of Andrew Auernheimer, a.k.a. Weev, took another step yesterday when the unrepentant Internet troll was sentenced to 41 months in (U.S.) prison for one count of identity fraud and one count of unauthorized computer access.

We've posted about Weev in the past: Free Weev. Free Weev?

Free Weev, CFAA

Much of today's press coverage (and Twitter reaction) is singularly focused on the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) — which is the (vaguely written) law related to the count of unauthorized access.

Some folks are voicing concern that Weev's sentencing will have a "chilling effect" on security research.

But not to worry!

Almost all of the coverage we've seen really fails to consider the charge of identity fraud.

So here's a handy how-to guide on avoiding trouble when disclosing a security flaw:

  1.  Don't be an asshole troll.
  2.  When you discover a flaw, don't abuse it. Only do enough to demonstrate the problem, no more.
  3.  Don't collect, record, and then transmit personally identifiable information (PII) belonging to other people.
  4.  When contacting reporters, have them volunteer their own device IDs to demonstrate the flaw.

Simple.

On 19/03/13 At 12:24 PM

Malware World Map, ASCII Edition

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A member of our Lab Development team — Jyrki — has given our malware world map a facelift.



ASCII interface, Linux distro, boots from USB drive.

Cool.

On 20/03/13 At 01:21 PM

Hackathon Malaysia 2013

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Are you ready for 24 hours of coding madness?

hackathon2013 (62k image)

Do you have what it takes to develop a killer app in 24 hours? Do you love innovation, coding and having fun altogether?

If you do, here's your chance to innovate and drive safe web applications to the next level. F-Secure Malaysia will once again be hosting the Hackathon event, where developers and their teammates spend 24 intense hours coming up with applications to make the web a safer place for us all.

This year’s theme is "Securing service in the Web" and developers will be provided with a variety of API’s to pull relevant details such as web reputation and real-time malware detection from our cloud network.

The event will be held at our Bangsar South, Kuala Lumpur office on 12 - 13 April. The winner will be rewarded with a dinner with our very own Mikko Hypponen, a great opportunity to pick the brain of a world-recognized malware researcher.

More details and sign-up are available at the Hackathon at F-Secure Malaysia campaign site.

On 22/03/13 At 02:57 AM

Online World

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The real world isn’t like the online world.

In the real world, you only have to worry about the criminals who live in your city. But in the online world, you have to worry about criminals who could be on the other side of the planet. Online crime is always international because the Internet has no borders.

Today computer viruses and other malicious software are no longer written by hobbyist hackers seeking fame and glory among their peers, but by professional criminals who are making millions with their attacks. These criminals want access to your computer, your PayPal passwords, and your credit card numbers.

I spend a big part of my life on the road, and I’ve visited many of the locations that are considered to be hotspots of online criminal activity. I’ve met the underground and I’ve met the cops. And I’ve learned that things are never as simple as they seem from the surface. One would think that the epicenter for banking attacks, for example, would prioritize fighting them, right?

Right, but dig deeper and complications emerge. A good example is a discussion I had with a cybercrime investigator in Brazil. We spoke about the problems in Brazil and how Sao Paolo has become one of the largest source of banking Trojans in the world.

The investigator looked at me and said, "Yes. I understand that. But what you need to understand is that Sao Paolo is also one of the murder capitals of the world. People are regularly gunned down on the streets. So where exactly should we put our resources? To fight cybercrime? Or to fight crimes where people die?"

It’s all a matter of balancing. When you balance the damage done by cybercrime and compare it to a loss of life, it’s pretty obvious what’s more important.

National police forces and legal systems are finding it extremely difficult to keep up with the rapid growth of online crime. They have limited resources and expertise to investigate online criminal activity. The victims, police, prosecutors, and judges rarely uncover the full scope of the crimes that often take place across international boundaries. Action against the criminals is too slow, the arrests are few and far between, and too often the penalties are very light, especially compared with those attached to real-world crimes.

Because of the low prioritization for prosecuting cybercriminals and the delays in launching effective cybercrime penalties, we are thereby sending the wrong message to the criminals and that’s why online crime is growing so fast. Right now would-be online criminals can see that the likelihood of their getting caught and punished is vanishingly small, yet the profits are great.

The reality for those in positions such as the Sao Paolo investigator is that they must balance both fiscal constraints and resource limitations. They simply cannot, organizationally, respond to every type of threat. If we are to keep up with the cybercriminals, the key is cooperation. The good news is that the computer security industry is quite unique in the way direct competitors help each other. It’s not publicly known, but security companies help each other out all the time.

On the surface, computer security vendors are direct competitors. And in fact, the competition is fierce on the sales and marketing side. But on the technical side, we’re actually very friendly to each other. It seems that everyone knows everyone else. After all, there are only a few hundred top-level antivirus analysts in the whole world.

These analysts meet in face-to-face private meetings, closed workshops, and at security conferences. We run encrypted and closed mailing lists. We chat in secure online systems. And in these venues we exchange information on what’s happening.

On the surface, this doesn’t seem to make sense. Why do we cooperate with our competitors to such a large extent? I believe it’s because we have a common enemy.

You see, normal software companies do not have enemies, just competitors. In our business, it’s different. Obviously we have competitors, but they are not our main problem. Our main problem is the virus writers, the bot authors, the spammers, and the phishers. They hate us. They often attack us directly. And it’s our job to try to keep them at bay and do what we can to protect our customers from them.

In this job, all the vendors are in the same boat. This is why we help each other.

And we need all the help we can get to keep up with the changing landscape of online attacks.

All this is happening right now, during our generation. We were the first generation that got online. We should do what we can to secure the net so that it will be there for future generations to enjoy.

Mikko Hypponen

This text was originally published as foreword in Christopher Elisan's book Malware, Rootkits & Botnets, A Beginner's Guide

On 22/03/13 At 01:54 PM

South Korean Wipers and Spear Phishing E-mails

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News broke last week of a "wiper" malware that affected South Korean banks and broadcasting companies. NSHC Red Alert Team has published a detailed analysis of the malware here. There were several hashes mentioned for the same component, which suggest multiple operations under the same campaign.

So how did the affected companies get infected? No one knows for sure. However we came across the following archive:

Archive

The filename of the archive roughly translate to "The customer's account history". As a side note, Shinhan bank was one of the affected companies according to reports.

Those with keen eye would notice that the malware inside the archive is using double extensions combined with a very long filename to hide the real extension. This is a common social engineering tactic that started during the era of mass mailing worms almost a decade ago. Therefore we believe the archive is most likely sent as attachment in spear phishing e-mails.

The malware has a datestamp of March 17, 2013, which is just few days before the incidents. It uses the icon of Internet Explorer and opens the following decoy upon execution:

HTML decoy document

In the background, the malware downloads and executes the following:

   hxxp://www.6885.com/uploads/fb9c6013f1b269b74c8cd139471b96fc/feng.jpg
   saved as %systemdirectory%\hzcompl.dll

   hxxp://www.clickflower.net/board/images/start_car.gif
   saved as %systemdirectory%\%random%.dll

   hxxp://mailimg.nate.com/mail/img/button/btn_mycomputer.gif
   saved as %systemdirectory%\sotd.dll

Several other HTTP requests are also made, possibly to download other dependencies of the payloads or simply to obscure the malicious requests from admins monitoring the network traffic.

The URLS are either already down or cleaned during our analysis. However the filenames still gave us some clue on the styles of the attacker. For example the file extensions suggest that the payload may be a DLL file. Also "btn_mycomputer.gif" suggest that the payload may disguise as an image of a button in a URL. Since we are investigating for possible links to the wiper payloads, we started looking at existing samples.

Although we were not able to find exact matches, there were a couple variants of the wiper component that matches the style. The first uses a similarly themed filename called "mb_join.gif" which may be trying to disguise as an image of a join button on some mobile banking website. The other is a time triggered DLL sample:

Time trigger

The code above is equivalent to "(month * 100 + day) * 100 + hour >= 32,015" which will only be satisfied during March 20 15:00 and later.

Besides spear phishing e-mails, not all affected systems need to get infected themselves. Some variants also wipe remote systems using credentials found in configuration files of certain SSH clients installed in infected systems. Therefore an affected system can simply have one of its user, who uses a vulnerable SSH client, infected for it to get toasted!

It is interesting to note that Felix Deimel and VanDyke SSH clients as well as the RAR archive were used in the attacks. These are either third party applications or not supported by Windows natively. Not to mention the attacks specifically wipe remote Linux and Unix based systems. All these specifics give the impression of a targeted attack.

On 25/03/13 At 09:43 AM

How much difference can an ISP make over an outbreak?

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F-Secure works extensively with ISPs and operators. We were assisting several large operators last year during the remediation of the DNSChanger malware.

There was an interesting study recently done by researchers at Georgia Tech. They compared how different ISPs responded to DNSChanger and what were the differences in the outcome.

Georgia Tech DNSChanger

You can download a presentation on their findings from here.

This research was originally presented at the M3AAWG 27th General Meeting in San Francisco.






On 25/03/13 At 03:10 PM

Whois behind South Korean wiper attacks?

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Last week, when "wiper" malware hit South Korean companies, the website of LG Uplus was reportedly defaced as well.

From The Register:

The Register Report

Due to the proximity of the incidents, the "Whois Team" is being suspected as the perpetrators of the wiper attacks. However this is still being debated.

From Ars Technica:

Ars Technica Report

We browsed through wiper samples yesterday, and discovered a variant that contains a routine that searches for web documents (e.g. ".html", ".aspx", ".php", etc.) in an infected system. The malware overwrites these documents with a content that looks exactly like that seen in the video below:



We believe this sample is clearly related to the one used in the defacement of the LG Uplus website.

The sample has a timestamp that is similar to the other wiper samples.

The timestamp of the DLL-wiper sample from yesterday's post:

DLL Wiper Timestamp

Timestamp of the defacer-wiper sample:

Defacer-wiper Timestamp

However, this variant used a completely different approach to wipe the drives. It infected the MBR with the following code to wipe the disk during the next boot-up:

Bootstrap Wiper

Also, unlike the other variants, this sample does not use the strings "HASTATI", "PRINCIPES", etc. when wiping the file system. This time it overwrites the files with zero's, rename them to a random filename before finally deleting them. It also avoids files found in Windows and Program Files directory. All this make sense because the attacker needed the infected webserver to continue hosting the defaced pages.

So do we think the attacks are related? Most probably they are. Only that this one was carried out by a different member.

On 26/03/13 At 03:19 PM


Facebook removes a privacy control, surprised?

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On March 27th, Joey Tyson, a privacy and security engineer at Facebook, asked:

status/317006898274635776

In general, I think many people tend to trust Google more than Facebook. Any thoughts from my followers on why that might be?

Tyson, a.k.a. Social Hacking, is a privacy advocate, and was long before he began working for Facebook.

twitter.com/theharmonyguy

He's asking an important question. Why do people trust Google more than Facebook?

Well here's an example of why…

Recently, I tested Graph Search. And at the time, I pointed out the "Clear Searches" option in Facebook's settings, which can be used to purge one's search history. Or at least it could.

Facebook Settings, Clear Searches

Late last week… poof! The option disappeared from Facebook's settings.

Facebook Settings, No Clear Searches

And it's gone. Just like that. Like it never existed.

And what showed up (temporarily) over the weekend?

Gifts:

Facebook Gifts

I've been waiting for something like this to pop up ever since I noticed "Gifts" returned to Facebook's settings:

Facebook Settings, Gifts

Why, if I didn't know any better… I'd suspect Facebook's Graph Search was not designed to help me locate things of interest, but rather, to generate interactions which can be used to profile me. And then that consumer analysis can used to prompt my friends and family to buy me gifts?

Seriously, why should anybody "trust" Facebook?

I didn't sign up to have my searches, and other data, used to recommend things. (That's Amazon's job.)

Both Amazon and Google provide an option to pause/suspend/purge search history.

I expect no less from Facebook.

Whatever else its faults, at least Google never seems to just up and delete a component of its privacy dashboard. And when Google rolls out a new service, it doesn't just come and go seemingly on a whim.

Facebook privacy controls: here today and gone tomorrow. — And that's no way to build trust.

Regards,
Sean

Updated: Facebook — the company whose motto is "Move Fast and Break Things"— blames a bug for the disappearance.

On 02/04/13 At 03:30 PM

Facebook Claims it's a "Bug"

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Yesterday's post noted the disappearance of Facebook's option to clear searches.

Late last night, I spoke with Zach Miners, of IDG News Service. He investigated the situation and was told by Facebook:

"Its disappearance was caused by a bug and was not intentional."

Zach Miners, IDG News

A bug?

Really. What a complete load of bollocks. When your company motto is "Move Fast and Break Things", I'm rather more inclined to believe it's a case of oversight, human error, and/or incompetence.

startupquote.com/post/1624569753
startupquote.com/post/1624569753

Or perhaps "bug" is Facebook lingo for "oops, my bad"?

Seriously Facebook… STOP MOVING SO FAST!

When it comes to security and privacy controls: done is — NOT — better than perfect.

Regards,
Sean

On 03/04/13 At 09:32 AM

OS MAX:Flashback

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One year ago, Apple released a software update to combat Mac malware called Flashback.

And the question has been: who wrote the Flashback OS X worm?

Today, investigative security blogger extraordinaire Brian Krebs, has an answer: Maxim Selihanovich of Saransk, Mordovia.

Krebs on Security, Who Wrote the Flashback OS X Worm?

Read the full story at… Krebs on Security

Here's a screenshot of the "keenly detailed research paper" referenced by Krebs:

Flashback OS X Malware

Broderick's paper [PDF] and slides [PDF] are available for download. The paper was originally published at VB2012.






On 03/04/13 At 11:36 AM

Cutwail Spam Botnet Targeting Android Users

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Brett Stone-Gross of Dell SecureWorks has excellent analysis of Android malware being distributed via the Cutwail spam botnet.

Dell SecureWork's Stels Android Trojan Malware Analysis

Here's the conclusion:

Dell SecureWork's Stels Android Trojan Malware Analysis

"The distribution of the Stels trojan through a spam campaign is unusual for Android malware".

That's a bit of an understatement.

Stone-Gross's analysis is significant evidence of Android malware's evolution into mass-market crimeware.

—————

Hat tip to @iblametom

On 04/04/13 At 01:00 PM

Trojan:Android/Pincer.A

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Protip: don't install an Android application package file if it's named "Certificate.apk".

It's not legit (obviously).

Trojan:Android/Pincer.A is able to forward SMS messages and perform other actions based on commands it receives from its C&C. When installed, it will appear in the application menu as "Certificate" and will display related bogus messages when run.

CertificatePIN Code

Previous malicious mobile applications pretending to be certificates have been mobile components of banking trojans aimed at defeating two-factor authentication. The fact Pincer is able to forward SMS messages means it can certainly also be used as such.

The commands Pincer waits for are:

  •  start_sms_forwarding
  •  start_call_blocking
  •  stop_sms_forwarding
  •  stop_call_blocking
  •  send_sms
  •  execute_ussd
  •  simple_execute_ussd
  •  stop_program
  •  show_message
  •  delay_change
  •  ping

The show_message command enables interesting interactivity as it displays a message to the victim, the message content comes from the C&C at the same time as the command itself is delivered.

The call-home destinations for the trojan are http://198.xxx.xxx.xxx:9081/Xq0jzoPa/g_L8jNgO.php and +4479372xxxxx.

The IMEI of the phone is used as an identifier by the C&C server. Other information sent there includes phone number, device serial number, phone model, carrier, and OS version.

Of note: Pincer checks to see if it's being run in an emulator by checking the IMEI, phone number, operator, and phone model. (A common "anti-analysis" technique used by Windows malware.)

SHA1: 2157fd7254210ef2e8b09493d0e1be3b70d6ce69

Additional similar samples:

  •  9416551d3965d3918eef3788b0377963d7b77032
  •  1ebfc6f1f3e15773f23083c9d8d54771e28f5680

And on a final note…

The trojan includes a class called USSDDumbExtendedNetworkService. The URI_AUTHORITY variable is set to [redacted].com — and the redacted word is either associated with a French Canadian concrete company or else it may be the Twitter handle of a young Russian whose Google+ page lists employment as "Android developer".

We don't have any "concrete" evidence… but we're pretty sure Pincer doesn't have anything to do with Canada.

—————

Technical analysis by — Mikko Suominen

On 05/04/13 At 06:31 PM

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